...HE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992... ...Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From t... ...First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation... ...orma- tion that morning. In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD offi- cials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notifica... ...4 minutes to respond to American 77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentif... ...eikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 9/11 plot, at the time of his capture in 2003 Final 5-7.5pp 7/17/04 11:46 AM Page 148 that Bin Ladin likely agre... ...,Atta’s cellular telephone was used numerous times to call various lodging establishments in Florida from cell sites within Florida.We cannot confirm ... ...access to a major airport, travel agencies, hotels, and Western commercial establishments, was an ideal transit point. 111 Ali reportedly assumed the ... .... FBI searches of the records of other hotels near the airport and smaller establishments in Culver City failed to locate the hijackers, as did our ow...

... a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin?s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988?1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992?1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda?s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996?1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERR...