This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

This thesis examines three campaigns during which aerial terror raids, peripheral to the main war efforts and incapable of destroying the enemy war-making capacity, elicited disproportionate reactions from the targeted leaderships. The raids on London during World War I, the V-1 and V-2 raids on London three decades later, and the Scud attacks on Israel during Desert Storm each show evidence of overreaction by Allied/coalition leaders. A review of the nature of terrorism and of airpower reveals that aerial weapons are uniquely suitable as terror weapons. An analysis of the differences between nuisance attacks and conventional civilian bombing, along with an understanding of the pressures on the leaders involved, leads to an explanation for past overreactions: aerial terror raids shock targeted leaders into visceral responses. Historically short-lived, these responses are based on the pressures of representative government and the tendency to overestimate the capability of terror weapons while underestimating the resilience of the population....

INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE ANATOMY OF TERROR . . . . . 3 BEYOND THE TRENCHES . . . . 9 “V” FOR VENGEANCE . . . . . 13 DECISIVE TERROR . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . . 25 CONCLUSION . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

The study presents and analyzes the pros and cons of three possible options: (1) increasing active duty manning in all Guard fighter units, (2) increasing active duty manning in only a few select Guard fighter units, and (3) moving most, if not all, of the fighters out of the Guard and into the active duty force. If current trends play out, the US military will benefit from having thought about, discussed, and debated this problem. In their insightful study, Lieutenant Colonels Lucas and Johnson provide a fresh approach to finding a solution....

The predictable nature of American strategic bombing may make it vulnerable to a perceptive enemy. By offering him the opportunity to design, test, and employ countermeasures, American air commanders may have inadvertently limited their ability to achieve success....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EARLY YEARS AND WORLD WAR I . . . . 5 Notes . . . . 7 3 THE INTERWAR YEARS . . . . 9 Notes . . . .13 4 WORLD WAR II: THE EUROPEAN THEATER . . . . .15 Notes . . . .20 5 WORLD WAR II: THE PACIFIC THEATER . . . .23 Notes . . . .28 6 LIMITED WARFARE . . .31 Notes . . . .37 7 THE FUTURE . . . .39 Notes . . . .41...

During the Lebanon conflict, the Israeli Air Force(IAF) employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 2 2 THE LEBANON PERIOD . . . . . 3 Israeli Objectives . . . . . 3 Airpower’s Role . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 7 3 THE ISRAELI STRATEGY . . . . . 9 Defining the Israeli Strategy . . . . . 9 The Israeli Airpower Strategy . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . 13 The Shi’ites and Long-Term Security . . . . 13 Hizbollah and the PLO . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 5 EFFECTIVENESS OF IAF REPRISAL RAIDS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 19 6 WHY THE AIR STRIKES FAILED . . . . 21 Asymmetry of Motivation . . . . 22 Inability to Create Fear of Unacceptable Escalation . . . . 23 Lebanon Environment . . . . 23 Israeli Air Strikes Could Not Increase Costs on Attackers 24 Notes . . . . . 25 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 27 Summary of Findings . . . . . 27 Key Lessons . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29...

Women have served in and with the United States armed forces since the founding of our nation; yet it has only been since the 1970s that issues concerning women in the military have been seriously and systematically pursued by both scholars and military planners. This volume is an effort to identify and examine key events, questions, and policies pertaining to women in the United States armed forces. To do this, a multidisciplinary analytical strategy that incorporates the methodology and conceptual tools of history, social science, organizational theory, policy analysis, and future studies was adopted....

The initial question of this study concerns the debate between those who believe in a general Islamic threat, as defined most eloquently by Samuel P. Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, and others who see a small band of religious fanatics who have hijacked Islam from the moderate majority. This question about the source of terrorism has importance to the major Islamic nations as it does for Latin American countries, where Muslims are a largely undistinguishable minority....

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 UNDERSTANDING “ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Perspectives of Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Islamic Anti-Western Rage: Historic and Strategic Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Islamic Angst: Psychological and Religious Struggles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Clash or Collusion of Islamic Fundamentalists? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . 19 Muslim Demographics in the Region . . . . . .20 Islamic Terrorist Attacks in the Region . . . . 21 Islamic Terrorist Support in the Region . . . . 23 Muslims’ Geographic Connection with Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

In Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations, the authors propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be accomplished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area of command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are performed but also integrated into the planning process....

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM? . . . . . . . . . . . .4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EFFECTS . . . 17 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EFFECTS . . . . . . . 29 A GENERAL THEORY OF JOINT EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 AN IDEALIZED JOINT EBO PROCESS . . . . . . .55 WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE EBO METHODOLOGY?. . .77 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95...

Why was the United States Air Force (USAF) so resistant to the idea of dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses and electronic countermeasures support for its strikers? Why had they given the electronic combat (EC) mission almost entirely to the Navy? Was the technology of stealth really the driving force, or was there more? They needed money and technology to make them work. In short, I found the four elements of the model I propose in this paper....

...ace operations to our nation’s defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920–1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and ...

This study examines the development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919–1941. This period represents more than 20years of development in US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine. It was the first peacetime period of such development. Attack aviation during this time was a branch of aviation used to provide direct and indirect combat support to ground forces in the form of machine-gun strafing, light bombing, and chemical attacks....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Principal Research Question . . . . . 1 Background and Significance of the Problem . . . . 1 Limitations of the Study . . . . . 2 Definitions and Assumptions . . . . 2 Preview of the Argument . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 3 2 ATTACK THEORY AND DOCTRINE OF THE AIR SERVICE, 1919–1926 . . . . 5 Attack Aviation’s World War I Legacy . . . . 5 Air Service Attack Theory . . . . 6 Attack Doctrine Established . . . . . 8 Early Training and Maneuvers . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 13 3 ATTACK THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE AIR CORPS, 1926–1935 . . . . . 15 Attack Aviation in the New Air Corps . . . . 15 Air Corps Attack Theory . . . . . 16 Attack Doctrine Matures . . . . . 20 Annual Training and Maneuvers . . . . 22 Notes . . . . . 24 4 ATTACK THEORY AND DOCTRINE BEFORE WORLD WAR II, 1935–1941 . . . . . 27 Attack Aviation in the GHQ Air Force . . . . 27 Attack Theory Refined . . . . 28 Attack Doctrine before World War II . . . . 29 Prewar Codification of Doctrine . . . . . 32 Exercises, Maneuvers, and Lessons of War . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 34 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . 37 Summary of Findings . ....

The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three major phases: prehostility preparation, conduct of combat operations, and the results and analysis of the operation....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 3 2 EXPLANATION OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 5 Notes . . . . . . 13 3 CRITIQUES OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 15 Notes . . . . . . 22 4 THE BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 34 5 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR, GOLAN HEIGHTS ACTION . . 37 Notes . . . . . . 47 6 THE IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD BASRA ESCAPE . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . 63 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . 72...

The study reviews each force’s combat glider experience and analyzes it in light of the glider doctrine, or lack thereof, with which each began the war. While military cargo gliders have seen their day, recent technological advances in gliders make them a viable platform for certain missions requiring stealth and silence....

ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT 3 The Early Years in Germany 3 Early Gliders in the US 4 A US Military Glider? For What Purpose? 4 Gliders Head Into Combat. 5 Come Join the Glider pilot Corps! 8 Glider pilot Training Shortfalls 9 Military Gliders in Britain 12 OPERATIONAL USE OF GLIDERS 13 Germany 13 Early Commando Raids 14 Crete 15 Other Operations 16 US and Great Britain 17 Sicily 17 British Gliders are First to Normandy 24 US Glider Pilots Join the War in France 20 Disappointment at Arnhem 22 Operation Market 22 Glider Success Over the Rhine? 23 Operation Dragoon 24 US Commando Operations in Burma 25 Summation 26 POST-WAR GLIDER POLICY 27 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN GLIDERS 29 TODAY’S LIMITED MILITARY ROLE FOR GLIDERS 31 CONCLUSIONS 32 NOTES 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42...

While history cannot provide a panacea for global terrorism, today’s military can learn lessons from historical small wars and low intensity conflicts to train and employ forces effectively to wage and win a war of ideas to counter global insurgents and their ability to win popular support. This paper employs a review of two case studies, Malaya (1945–60) and Vietnam (1964–72), to illuminate my thesis....

Two examples from twentieth-century conflicts demonstrate the potential that missiles possess to disrupt an opponent’s land-based airpower and achieve significant political consequences. Iraq’s use of Scud ballistic missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War produced nearly instantaneous political effects. The Scuds did not threaten the coalition military forces opposing Saddam Hussein, but instead threatened the existence of the coalition itself by nearly bringing Israel into the war. Negating this threat demanded an urgent response from land-based airpower, and large numbers of coalition aircraft were forced to perform a new mission: Scud Hunting. Almost 50years before Desert Storm, the Allies in World War II had faced a similar threat from the V-1 and V-2. Thousands of sorties were diverted to bomb missiles that were chiefly fired at London and Antwerp. In both conflicts, coalition and Allied forces possessed enough airpower that the diversion did not prevent them from performing other necessary missions. Yet, in the future, as the United States Air Force (USAF)dwindles in numbers, the ability of land-based airpower to deal with the m...