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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 EXPECTATIONS OF COMMAND . . . 1 What Does the Boss Expect? . . . 2 What Do the Troops Expect? . . . 9 What Do You Expect? . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 VISION AND ENVIRONMENT . . . . . 23 Developing and Communicating Your Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Building the Environment . . . . . 30 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 WALKING THE WALK . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4 HANDLING JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 GREAT IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Take Responsibility for Fun . . . . 95 Sponsor Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Celebrate Heroes—Not Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Mentoring Program . . . . . . . . . . 104 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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Air Combat Command (ACC) relies on Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) systems for air-to-air combat training and large force employment flight debrief. Although extremely effective training enhancements, these systems are enormously expensive and typically require flight over restricted airspace ranges. These factors have prevented fleetwide implementation of ACMI training on a daily basis. This study presents a summary of the development of the current and proposed family of ACMI systems and the capabilities each system provides. The Kadena Interim Training System provides a suitable case study to compare requirements of current ACMI features to the capabilities available using internal components....

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1 BACKGROUND . . . . 1 2 ACMI CONCEPTS, SOLUTIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS . . . . 13 3 ACMI SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND KADENA INTERIM TRAINING SYSTEM . . . . . 21 4 PROPOSAL FOR INTERNAL SOLUTIONS . . . . . 27 5 POTENTIAL SYSTEM COMPONENTS AND CONFIGURATION . . . . . 45 6 POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES. . . . 55 7 CONCLUSIONS. . . . 63 8 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 67...

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Present and future force presentation options include more than just the single air domain, for the presentation of Air Force operations now includes the air, space, and cyberspace domains....

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DISCLAIMER . . . .ii FUTURE OPERATOR SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS Introduction/Background . . . .1 Methodology . . . .2 Determining the Future Operator Definition . . . . 5 Cross-domain Competencies . . . . 7 Cross-domain Force Development Path . . . .9 Force Development Paradigms . . . .18 Culture . . . .19 Summary . . . . .21...

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Colonel Paul “P. J.” McAneny offers an analysis focused on aircraft maintenance but applicable to the entire force and recommends cultural changes to support lasting transformation. He examines the impact of metrics on transformation and evaluates the USAF aircraft maintenance culture. He asks several questions: Can focused metrics precede cultural change? Does the aircraft maintenance community support a Red Is Good culture, in which metrics are used to illuminate problems rather than measure success or failure? If so, is the community a true learning organization that can maximize its impact through continuous process-improvement initiatives? The answers lead Colonel McAneny to recommend several Air Force–level changes to meet long-term aircraft readiness and reliability targets....

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Organizational change strategies for acquisition are essential due to the enormity of change required of the acquisition community. The Congress and the DOD have made many previous attempts at acquisition reform, but most have had little effect. To make sure our current reform efforts make positive, lasting changes, we must transform the acquisition culture. To date, little attention has been paid to cultural change aspects. To that end, this paper offers some ideas for organizations undergoing change for acquisition reform....

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This series is set not in the future but in the past, at the end of WWII. Is a Military Science fiction story with cloak and dagger. This particular story mimics the circumstances that at the time, in 2008 I as many Americans were in. Unemployment and other financial circumstances. Transposing social and economical concepts of 2008 to the world of 1947. By this time when I started to write this story, I was finally going to jobs interviews. Yet I was not out of the woods as the characters in the story....

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I decided to write this story not based on the future but in the past, at the end of WWII. When As many, I was unemployed and looking for work. To keep my preoccupation under control between job searches, application and letters of not getting a job, I started this series. This series of books are based on Military Science fiction with cloak and dagger, Romance as well modern social issues put in contrast to those found in the 1940's. It is more about a description of our 21st century translated to the 1940's America....

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To lead the US Air Force into the future, it is necessary to understand the past and present nature of the force. With this in mind, Air Force leaders have always sought to arm members of the force with a basic knowledge and understanding of Air Force culture and history. This volume is a contribution to that ongoing educational process, but as the title states, this is only an introduction. The information provided here merely scratches the surface of the fascinating stories of the people, equipment, and operations of the Air Force. Topics that are covered here in only a few short paragraphs have been, and will continue to be the subject of entire books. We hope this volume will be a starting point and a reference work to facilitate your continuing study of aerospace power....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 1 THE USAF TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 FRAMING THE QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 THE CURRENT FIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Irregular Warfare: Winning the Long War . . . 6 Air Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Strategic Communication: Spreading the Word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Culture and Language in the Expeditionary Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Distributed Planning: The Key to Centralized Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Unmanned Aerial Systems: The Air Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Intelligence Reform: The Secondary Effects of Merging Intelligence with Surveillance and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 The Total Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Air Base Disaster Planning: Contingency Operations . . . . . . ....

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This paper proposes two broad modifications to concepts and cultures to embed Effects Based Operations (EBO) at the critical nexus of the tactical and operational levels of war. Services, as part of the joint community, must narrowly define EBO in a quantifiable, measurable realm. The USAF needs to solve its tactical training/operational campaigning dichotomy by moving toward capabilities-based training. The services should stop clinging to the antiquated concept of separate and distinct levels of war with minimal similarities where no clear distinction actually exists. These small steps will build synergy between the execution of national policy and the planning that enables it. Such synergy may then aid the evolution toward the seamless continuum necessary for an EBO culture to thrive....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

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National leaders are debating the merits of American weapons in space. A decision to operationally deploy such weapons would reverse the United States’s long-standing commitment to space as a sanctuary. That sanctuary—the idea that space should remain relatively unthreatened by weapons—has been challenged in the past but for the most part still exists today. Further weaponizing space, though, could change that and introduces important issues. The political, military, social, economic, and diplomatic ramifications of American space weapons demand that strategists carefully consider all sides of this critical debate. Current defense literature, however, indicates analysts and leaders have been slow to develop the arguments supporting a space sanctuary. This omission could undermine the military community’s appreciation for all aspects of both problem and solution. In turn the quality of the space strategy eventually pursued might suffer. This study attempts to understand the argument against weapons in space. It asks the question: Could pursuing a space sanctuary policy in the immediate future benefit the national interest? This study...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DEFINITIONS . . . . 5 SPACE WEAPONS AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE . . . . 9 CONTEMPORARY US POLICY AND SPACE WEAPONS . . . . 21 THE SANCTUARY ARGUMENT . . . . 27 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 47...

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Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force’s initiative to recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. This paper identifies potential failure points associated with the changing Air Force culture. Overall, the Air Force’s change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. However, it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system’s alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for long-term sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21....

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In this paper, Lt Col Rex R. Kiziah, USAF, examines current US efforts to cooperatively develop and deploy with Japan and South Korea a theater missile defense (TMD) family of systems (FoS) in Northeast Asia. First, the author summarizes the US security strategy for the East Asia-Pacific region with emphasis on the importance of regional missile defense. Second, he characterizes the ballistic missile capabilities of North Korea and China, which constitute the primary threat in the region and have spurred increased US and allied pursuit of advanced TMD systems. Third, the author discusses the advantages, country-specific issues and status of cooperative US, Japanese, and South Korean TMD developmental activities. Finally, Colonel Kiziah details some of the complex regional security issues associated with US, Japanese, and South Korean missile defense activities vis-à-vis China and Taiwan; the challenges in ameliorating Chinese concerns; and the prospects of longterm partnering and fielding of a tri-country, integrated regional TMD system....

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First, this study develops a generalized model for United States military transformations in peacetime. To develop the model the author combines observations made by several historians about recurrent trends in military strategic innovation. The author concludes that, after taking into account inevitable uncertainty, there are three identifiable factors that occur in most cases of military transformation. The three key factors are the need for a coherent, congruent vision; an emerging culture that bolsters the vision and develops competing theories of victory to fulfill the vision; and a process for honestly assessing the maturing vision and its supporting theories of victory. After defining the limitations of the model and its usefulness, the author applies the framework to an important aspect of national security—the future of space power....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE TRANSFORMATION TRINITY . . . . 9 3 THE SPACE POWER VISION: MECCA OR MIRAGE? . . . . .23 4 CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SPACE COMMUNITY . . . . 39 5 ASSESSING SPACE THEORIES OF VICTORY . . . . 59 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 73...

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In Weather Operations in the Transformation Era, Col John M. Lanicci, USAF, takes a compelling look at future weather operations. His hypothesis is that a consolidated battlespace picture integrates both natural and man-made elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transformation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easier said than done and offers several cogent reasons why the weather operations portion of information-in-warfare has not caught up with current USAF doctrine.Significant advances in information technology and advent of effects-based operations are propelling the USAF weather community away from traditional, single-inject stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice to war fighters at every step of campaign/mission planning and execution. This technological momentum will make it necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analysis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outlines these changes in a concept called weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first used by the Air Staff to describe the total integration of natural and man-made environments ...

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A call is being made for an aircraft dedicated to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission within military academic circles and the special operations community. Support for a COIN aircraft needs hard numbers, given the Air Force’s budget constraints brought on by the dedication to the F- 22A. Building on Arthur Davis’s COIN aircraft advocacy paper, this research doesn’t focus on further advocacy, but on a process and method for COIN aircraft procurement. The acquisition focus is on United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) acquisition authority to couple its global war on terrorism (GWOT) mission responsibility with commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft procurement to specifically address the need for an airborne COIN capability....

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As leaders at all levels, our Airmen must be able to anticipate and appropriately respond to a complicated and fluid national security environment. Developing such Airmen will require stronger commitments to education and training on the part of the learner to the point where learning never stops. Fostering this highly favorable attitude toward learning is possible only if Air Force education and training programs address learners’ goals, motivations, social interactions, and individual learning styles. This means the Air Force needs a stronger focus on affective learning during the instructional design (ID) process for education and training....

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To help understand and begin to develop alternative policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context, the US Air Force’s Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and King’s College, London, hosted a two-day conference at the RUSI offices in London on 18 and 19 May 2009. We sought to bring together some of the best thinkers on deterrence to examine how to reinvigorate this essential tool for today’s policy community. The conference exceeded our expectations, as readers will observe from the excellent products in these proceedings. From the pre-conference “thought pieces” by RUSI’s Michael Codner and AFRI’s Adam Lowther—the presentations by the keynote speakers and case study developers—to the post-conference “Quick Looks” by AFRI personnel, the outcome reflects the creativity and the seriousness with which the attendees and the planning staffs approached the topic....

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1 Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: Conference Summary . . . . . . . 1 Adam Lowther 2 Defining “Deterrence” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Michael Codner 3 Understanding Deterrence . . . . . . . .27 Adam Lowther 4 Policy and Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Gen Norton A Schwartz, USAF Lt Col Timothy R. Kirk, USAF 5 Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF Greg Weaver 6 On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance . . 77 Keith B. Payne 7 Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . 121 8 Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123 Tom Scheber 9 Case Study—The August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Denis Corboy 10 Deterrence and Counterproliferation . . 149 Malcolm Chalmers 11 Deterrence and Saddam Hussein . . . 155 Barry Schneider 12 Stymieing Leviathan . . . . . . . . . 215 Paul Schulte 13 The Madrid Train Bombing . . . . . . .237 Peter Neumann 14 Framing Strategic Deterrence . . . . . . ...

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What follows are points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing. This in turn, hopefully, will give our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts....

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1 Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 Entering World War II, the Air Corps’s unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 The Air Corps entered World War II with a “Douhetian” concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children. . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 Airmen thought they could win the war alone. . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere. . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 B...

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Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

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Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

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As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

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1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...

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The antiwar of our entire nation is defined as being the army-impeded forces, skirmishing shoulder to shoulder with the civilian population, with the purpose of defeating all non-aggressors, for securing our country’s slavery and dependency. The defeat in this battle is assured through a moral inferiority of our population - the right cause of this antiwar -, the lack of heroism of our state’s citizens, by applying an adequate blundering, using our geographical disadvantages, and the international public humiliation. ...

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The battle and its non-goal. The battle is an ensemble of skirmishes of the subunits and units, which take place in a disorganized manner using armament and fighting techniques, for the expressed desire to enforce the enemy. The battle cannot take place on the ground, in the air, or on the water, in an open paradoxist cooperation with all-military denominations, and using their armament’s procedures with the goal of empowering the non-aggressor enemy. The battle is not the only way for obtaining the miscarriage. The battle’s goal is not the destruction or the capture of enemy’s groups, or the capture and holding on of critical portions of terrain. While in anti-defense, the defeat with fewer forces of the enemy’s superior forces would be done with our old-fashioned technique: ...

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Instruction Notebooks...............................3 Table of Contents .................................4 1 The Non-Tactical Instruction...........................10 Non-Assignment 1. ...............................10 The battle and its non-goal. ...........................12 The principles of non-organizing the battle’s actions. .................13 Non-Assignment 2...............................13 The disorganization principle of the subunits of unpatriotic guards. ............15 The subunits of the other branches of the military, their non-role, and their non-missions. ....15 The non-role and non-missions unsustainable by the other branches of the military. ......16 Not understanding the modern military ......................17 General principles disregarding the non-actions conducted by the subunits of a non-modern military in the inoffensive battles............................18 The anti-defense forms............................20 The non-roles and the non-missions of the fight units. .................20 The non-insurance for battle...........................20 The content of the battle’s non-insurance, its goal...