Description Details
This study analyzes the effectiveness of airpower versus terrorism using three case studies.

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1 Terrorism: Its Impact, the New American Approach, and Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1 2 Operation El Dorado Canyon: Airpower versus Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3 Operation Infinite Reach: The 1998 US Embassy Bombing Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4 The Second Palestinian Intifada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 APPENDIX: THE OSLO NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
The traditional American military brute-force strategy does not always meet our national needs in this new world order. Strategic Coercion offers one alternative to this brute-force approach. Simply stated, strategic coercion is the act of inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which he is averse. It involves using force and threatening action to compel an adversary to cease his current activity, or coerce him to reverse actions already taken. Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force....

Description Details
This study analyzes the evolution of Seventh Air Force’s joint command and control (C2) relationships as well as the development of joint operational procedures and doctrine in the Central Pacific during World War II. As this was arguably the most joint theater in World War II, there are many lessons about the challenges of joint C2 and the development of joint combat procedures that are relevant to contemporary airmen....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 BEGINNINGS—THE FORGING OF SEVENTH AIR FORCE . . 9 3 EARLY CAMPAIGNS: THE GILBERTS AND THE MARSHALLS . . . . 21 4 LATER CAMPAIGNS: NEUTRALIZATION OF THE CAROLINES, MARIANAS CAMPAIGN, IWO JIMA, AND OKINAWA . . . . 43 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . 75...

Description Details
Over the years many researchers have analyzed the political aspects of the air war in Southeast Asia. Their studies range from the original Pentagon Papers to those published more recently. Very little, however, focuses on the economic and operational aspects of the war. The purpose of this book is to fill that void by presenting a set of case studies that subject selected air campaigns during the Southeast Asia era to rigid economic analysis....

Description Details
In this excellent essay Lt Col David G. Curdy examines the prospects for democratic transitions in the Middle East. He notes that with the conclusion of the cold war, the basis for US Middle East policy, which had centered around oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union, should be reexamined and, perhaps, redesigned....

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Col William Palmby’s award-winning study, Outsourcing the Air Force Mission: A Strategy for Success, explores how the Air Force must adjust to this new reality of a world where the state no longer possesses a monopoly on war. He reviews the history and driving forces that have led to increased outsourcing by the Air Force, finding that while it may be the most dominant such force in history, the range of roles turned over to the private market means that private companies and their employees now have a significant influence on the very success or failure of its critical operations....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 WHERE WE ARE TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4 A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59...

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Formative Years in Total War . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2 Marketing A Vision (1945–53) . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 Curtis E. LeMay and the Rise of the Strategic Air Command (1948–57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4 The Apogee of Strategic Air Command and the Missile Challenge (1961–62) . . . . 103 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 5 Flexible Response and the Ossification of the Senior Absolutists (1963–65) . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6 Absolutists and the Frustration of Airpower in Vietnam (1964–69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 7 The Vindication of Airpower and the Rise of the Fighter Community (1965–72) . . . . 185 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 8 Changing of the Guard: The Rise of the Fighter Generals (1973–82) . . . . . . 211 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE HUMP AIRLIFT OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Illustrations Figure Page 1 Air Force Leadership Framework (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 A NEED FOR CHANGE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AS A MODEL FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 REFORMING INTELLIGENCE: A 50-YEAR EFFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4 THE 9/11 REPORT AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5 THE PUSH AND PULL OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 6 THE QUESTION OF BALANCE . . . . . . . . . 139 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Appendix A INTERVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 B CHRONOLOGY OF INTELLIGE...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii NOTE from the Commander of Air University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 PHOTOGRAPHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 WHAT BECAME OF THEM? . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
Since our founding 50 years ago, the US Air Force has been responsible to the nation for controlling and exploiting the air and space environment. We are the nation’s Air Force—the only service that provides air and space power across the spectrum, from basic research to combat operations. In Apollo’s Warriors, Col Michael Haas, USAF, Retired, brings to life the critical, albeit little-known, contributions US Air Force special operations forces have made to the exercise of air and space power....

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The years from 1947 through the beginning of the twenty first century witnessed the USAF steadily progress until it became the preeminent air force in the world. With less than 400,000 active duty personnel, the USAF has capabilities and tasks today that were not imaginable six decades ago. The World War II legacy from the Army Air Forces, epitomized in the familiar Air Force song lyrics “off we go into the wild blue yonder, climbing high into the sky!” is not forgotten. However, a strong professional image and unparalleled responsibilities in air and space are far more descriptive of today’s USAF....

Description Details
By the end of the Vietnam War, advances in technology allowed these FACs to control strikes against targets at night, in bad weather, and with improved precision. Laser-guided weapons systems, new computer navigation equipment, and advanced ground radars combined to provide an effective and lethal capability. If the Mosquitoes were an annoyance in Korea, the Wolves of Vietnam proved to be a deadly addition to the concept of FAC....

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PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

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1 GREAT ADVENTURE BEGINS . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THREE MUSKETEERS TIMES TWO . . . . . . . 11 3 AIR-TO-GROUND BATTLE FOR ITALY . . . . .45 4 OPERATION STRANGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65...

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1 Do Concepts Matter· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 9 2 Instant Thunder: Why an Air Staff Plan · · 27 3 How Does Airpower Work?· · · · · · · · · · · · 51 4 Knockout Blow? Or Decision on Points? · · ·71 5 The Objective · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·85 6 Taking It to the Enemy· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·97 7 Seizing the High Ground: Airpower as a Maneuver Element? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 8 Setup for the Knockout Blow · · · · · · · · · 127 9 The First Information War · · · · · · · · · · ·145 10 Conclusions: What Is Air (and Space) Power? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 163 EPILOGUE: A View of the Air Force Today and Tomorrow · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·185 GLOSSARY· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 197 INDEX · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·201...

Description Details
This study analyzes the role of the military commander in termination planning during operations other than war. First, the author assesses past and present political guidance, such as the Weinberger doctrine and the presidential directive on peace operations, as well as conditions that affect exit strategy planning. The conclusion is that most of the guidance is vague and that internal and external influences make the process of transforming political goals into viable military objectives very difficult....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Methodology and Analytical Criteria . . . . 2 Definition of Terms . . . . 4 Summary . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . 5 2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS . . . . . 7 Weinberger’s Principles . . . . . 7 Current Guidance . . . . 11 Planning for Conflict Termination . . . . 13 Summary . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . 17 3 SOMALIA CASE STUDY . . . . 21 Political Considerations . . . . . 22 United Nations Mandates . . . . 23 Exit Strategy . . . . . 25 Success or Failure? . . . . 26 Weinberger’s Principles Revisited . . . . 27 Summary . . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29 4 HAITI CASE STUDY . . . . 31 Political Considerations . . . . . 32 United Nations Mandates . . . . 34 Exit Strategy . . . . . 35 Success or Failure? . . . . 37 Guidance Revisited . . . . 39 Summary . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . 46...

Description Details
A huge portion of the military burden in support of these operations falls on the shoulders of the Mobility Air Forces (MAF). Lt Col Eileen M. Isola’s Leading Air Mobility Operations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies provides just such an educational foundation for MAF war fighters charged with leading CHEs. She provides a superb synthesis of a dozen years of lessons learned from many resources and institutions, sifting through the tactical and operational lessons learned so as to focus her research into the most important tenets for strategic success in a CHE: build a team of teams, gather and share information (not “intelligence”), and establish centers for interagency success. She reviews key joint and service doctrine manuals, culling critical nuances that would likely be overlooked by war fighters new to the CHE environment, or rushed in a crisis deployment. Her cultural comparison of the military and nongovernmental organizations is insightful and valuable. Throughout her work Colonel Isola provides tangible, real examples from past operations of what worked and what did not—and why. The implications for the future are clear...

Description Details
In 1944 a young man from Nahant, Massachusetts, experienced World War II as an unsung corporal assigned to an unheralded unit near an obscure English village. Few history books recall his war. But he and his unit personified a brand of service—seldom newsworthy, often tedious, always selfless—that underpinned Allied victory. This man was my father. This research paper is his unit’s story....

Description Details
This paper investigates the DOD’s tactical logistical challenges and each service’s tactical lift requirements, especially with respect to the movement of supplies from forward supply hubs to forward forces. To address these challenges and requirements, the author suggests the use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) as a potential solution. Focusing on existing and quickly emerging technologies as well as the joint operating requirements, the author proposes RPA performance and design characteristics along with a concept of employment that increases tactical lift capabilities and meets all current service requirements....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . .1 Notes . . . . . 12 2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . .15 Notes . . . . 26 3 TECHNOLOGY REVIEW/PROOF OF CONCEPT . . .27 Notes . . . .41 4 PROPOSED SOLUTION . . . . 45 Notes . . . . .51 5 SYNOPSIS OF CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT . . . .53 Notes . . . . 59 6 CONCLUSION . . . . .61...

Description Details
At first glance, strategic aerial reconnaissance appears to be a mere technical tool. The term refers to the use of aircraft to collect strategic intelligence using photographic or electronic means. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), strategic intelligence refers to “intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.” Strategic intelligence includes information provided by sources other than aircraft, including naval vessels, ground communications intercept sites, satellites, published literature, defectors, and spies. Because Air Force aircraft provided the bulk of information used by American war plans from 1945 to 1953, this book focuses on the origins of the USAF strategic aerial reconnaissance. Although official JCS publications did not specifically list strategic aerial reconnaissance, the term may be defined as the use of aircraft to gather information necessary to conduct strategic air war, also called strategic air bombardment....

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1 THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 GROPING IN THE DARK: RECONNAISSANCE BEFORE CONTAINMENT, 1945 –1946 . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 3 FROM CONTAINMENT TO BERLIN: ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO FILL INTELLIGENCE GAPS, 1947–1948 . . . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 STRATEGIC BOMBING QUESTIONED: INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS AND WAR PLANS, 1949 –1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 5 THE TEST: STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE IN KOREA, 1950 –1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174...

Description Details
This study analyzes the air war plans in World War II and the Persian Gulf War. The goal of this study is to ascertain whether there is a continuity of thought reflected in American air planning over the years. This study assesses Air War Plans Division–1/42 and Instant Thunder as to their importance to contemporary airpower theory. This study concludes that there is a continuity of thought reflected in major air plans, particularly in the issues of strategic bombing, precision attack, and command and control. This study also evaluates Korea and Vietnam as a bridge between World War II and Operation Desert Storm and evaluates the implications of this demonstrated continuity of thought on current and future Air Force doctrine and strategy....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN AIRPOWER THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 AIR WAR PLANS DIVISION–42 . . . . . . . . .13 4 KOREA AND VIETNAM: THE BRIDGE . . . . . .25 5 INSTANT THUNDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . .55...

Description Details
The importance of combat effects in warfare has no second. However, most combat effects would never be delivered without crucial information delivered from combat support forces. In this time of turbulent recapitalization and reorganization within the Air Force, the critical nature of combat and combat support effects must remain foremost in our decisions as we create new commands, place people and resources where needed, and forecast budgets....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi EXPANSION OR MARGINALIZATION: HOW EFFECTS-BASED ORGANIZATION COULD DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . .1 Domain versus Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Kepler Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Filling the Effects-Based Void . . . . . . . . . . .13 Further Consolidation for Better Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Combat Support Is the Mission . . . . . . . . . 23 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41...

Description Details
In “The National Guard Citizen-Soldier,” Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy....

Description Details
This study explores the contemporary relevance of the Guadalcanal campaign to current military operations. Specifically, it uses expeditionary joint air operations flown from Henderson Field during the period August 1942 to February 1943 as a case study for the employment of airpower from an austere airfield. Henderson Field provides a historical example of the expeditionary airfield as a center of gravity for joint military operations, and it demonstrates that key force enablers provide critical capabilities for the use of airpower from austere airfields....

Description Details
Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affected both interagency processes and policy outcomes during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and the early stages of the Bosnia crisis (1993–95). Going one-on-one with members of Washington’s policy elite who were involved directly in these two cases, the author demonstrates that the US government’s approach to termination policy proved fragmented and personality driven. She systematically presents evidence to support the study’s conclusion, revealing that the nature of the gap between diplomats and war fighters will consistently produce policies that bring about cease-fire in the form of war termination, but fail to address the underlying causes and conditions that generated conflict (and, potentially, war). These issues must be resolved if the US government hopes to improve the social and political conditions of those embroiled in conflict while at the same time bolstering a security posture favorable to US interests in the aftermath of intervention. The three sections of this work thematically present...

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PART I Framing the Problem 1 CONFLICT TERMINATION WITHIN A BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . 3 Interagency Decision Making via Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . 5 The Efficacy of the Policy-Making Process . . 14 Outline of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHOICE . . . . . . . 27 Decision-Making Approaches: Units of Analysis as Delimiters . . . . . . . . . 28 Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Groups as “Less than Rational” Actors . . . . .41 Rationale for Alternative Approaches . . . . . .48 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 CONFLICT TERMINATION MODELS . . . . . . 61 Points or Processes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 Rational Actor Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . 85 Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Approach . . . . 85 US Government Decision Making . . . . . . . . 92 ...

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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 British Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The V-1 Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 American Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . 22 German Flak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Allied Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Fratricide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 The US Navy in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Japanese Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . .53 The Lessons of World War II . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2 FROM GUNS TO MISSILES, 1945–1965 . . .69 Antiaircraft Returns to Combat: The Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Antiaircraft Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 3 AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS: VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113 French Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 America Enters the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114...

Description Details
This paper addresses Marine Corps aviation’s contribution in the area of air-ground integration during the Second World War. I chose this topic because it is not an area that has been widely researched, and it deals with a mission that I am tasked with as a FA-18 pilot. The issue of air-ground integration is as relevant today as it was in World War II, and it has many implications for air support in the joint arena....

Description Details
Air Force colonel Chad Manske traces the roots of the NSC to its organizational prototype—the British Committee of Imperial Defence. By comparing these institutions, their functions, purposes, leadership, and assessing how each changed over time, we gain an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches to policy development. Colonel Manske successfully draws on comparative historical experience to make sound recommendations for strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of the National Security Council as a deliberative policy coordinating body within the Executive Office of the President....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 The British Committee of Imperial Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 3 The US National Security Council . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4 The Committee of Imperial Defence and the National Security Council: Comparison and Contrast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 5 Analysis, Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90...